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ESTATE TAXATION
INTERPLAY OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW IN DETERMINING
DEDUCTIBLE ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES

Estate of Smith v. Commissioner
For federal estate tax purposes, administration expenses allowed by the jurisdiction in which an estate is administered are
deductible from the value of the gross estate.' One of the regulations promulgated under the applicable provision of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, section 2053(a), however, limits the deduction to such expenses as are necessarily incurred for the benefit of
the estate. 2 The interplay between the Code, the regulation, and
state law has created two areas of controversy: First, the effect of a
lower state court's approval of an administration expense upon
subsequent federal tax litigation; and second, the validity of the
additional requirements imposed by the treasury regulation. In
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,3 the Second Circuit held that federal
courts are not precluded from examining de novo the validity of an
administration expense approved by a lower state court. 4 Although
the Second Circuit did not decide whether state law, the treasury
regulation, or both should be applied in the de novo inquiry, its
opinion in Smith seems to indicate that the federal courts should
apply both criteria in determining the deductibility of an administration expense. 3
The bulk of the estate of the decedent, a professional sculptor,
consisted of a collection of his own works. In view of the volatile
nature of the art market, the executors instructed Marlborough'I

r. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of the [federal estate tax], the value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such amounts(2) for administration expenses,
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the
United States, under which the estate is being administered.
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3, T.D. 6296, 1958-2 Cuot. BULL. 432, 542; as amended, Treas.
Reg. § 20.2053-3(d), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 Cut. BULL. 367, provides in pertinent part:
The amounts deductible from a decedent's gross estate as "administration expenses". . . are limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in
the administration of the decedent's estate; that is, in the collection of assets,
payments of debts, and distribution of property ....
Expenditures not essential to
the proper settlement of the estate, but incurred for the individual benefit of the
heirs . . . may not be taken as deductions ....

' 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 96 S. Ct. 44 (1975), aff'g 57 T.C. 650 (1972).
4 510 F.2d at 482-83.
'Id. See notes 15 & 29 infra.
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Gerson Galleries to sell the sculptures in order to avoid depreciation of the estate. In the course of these sales, the estate paid a total
of $1,583,544.67 in commissions, all of which were allowed by a
New York surrogate. The major portion of the proceeds was paid
into a trust established by the decedent in his will, and the remainder was applied to estate debts, expenses, and taxes. Rejecting the
executors' attempt to deduct from the value of the gross estate the
entire amount of the sales commissions approved by the surrogate,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue allowed only those commissions paid on sales necessary to satisfy all claims against the
estate, administration expenses, and taxes. On a petition for redetermination, the Tax Court declared that allowability under the laws
of the jurisdiction in which the estate is administered is merely a
threshold requirement for deductibility.6 Holding that any deduction must also satisfy the criteria established in the treasury regulation, the court found that the commissions on those sales used to
fund the trust were not deductible since the "necessity" requirements of the regulation were not met.7 A dissenting opinion was
filed in which the treasury regulation was regarded as an invalid
extension of the requirements for deductibility established by Congress in the Code."
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Tax Court's decision was,
affirmed by a divided panel. Judge Anderson, writing for the
majority, preferred to view the proceedings of the Tax Court as a de
novo inquiry into the necessity of the expenses for the purpose of
section 2053(a) 9 rather than as a refusal to approve the deduction
6 57 T.C. at 661.

The Tax Court decision centered around the necessity for the sales, rather than the
necessity for the commissions, and found the sales to be unnecessary within the treasury
regulation standards. The court applied Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2), T.D. 6826, 1965-2
CuN. BULL. 367, 368,formerly Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 CON. BULL.
432, 544, which provides in pertinent part:
Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary in
order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve
the estate, or to effect distribution ....
The court stated that the sales were not necessary for distribution since the sculptures could
have been transferred to the trust in kind. Responding to an argument that the sales were
necessary to provide support for Smith's children, the court indicated that this was a
responsibility of the trust rather than the estate and that, had the sculptures been transferred to the trust, the trust could have conducted the necessary sales. The court also
rejected the executors' contention that the sales were necessary to preserve the estate, stating
that the volatile nature of the art market does not create "an unexpectedly serious development which sometimes may make sales the sine qua non of preserving the estate." 57 T.C. at
661.
6 57 T.C. at 663-64 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
,9The court stated that "there is some question as to whether some of these expenses
were in fact incurred ... in accordance with the general purposes of § 2053 ...... 510 F.2d
at 482. It should be noted, however, that the § 2053(a) deduction requires only that an
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of an administration expense allowable under the laws of New
York.' 0 In justifying such an inquiry, Judge Anderson reasoned:
[F]ederal courts cannot be precluded from reexamining a lower
state court's allowance of administration expenses to determine
whether they were in fact necessary to carry out the administration of the estate or merely prudent or advisable in preserving
the interests of the beneficiaries."
Noting that both New York law and the treasury regulation require
an administration expense to be necessary, 1 2 the Second Circuit in
effect equated the Tax Court's determination that the sales commissions failed to fulfill the treasury regulation with a ruling that they
failed to satisfy New York law.' 3 Judge Mulligan, dissenting, considered the approval of an administration expense by the state
surrogate sufficient grounds for deductibility. Declaring that allowability under state law is the sole criterion for deductibility
under the Code and that state law is most appropriately applied by
state courts, he concluded that the Tax Court should be bound by
4
a prior state court decision.'
The Second Circuit's approval of a de novo inquiry by the Tax
Court into the allowability under state law of an administration
expense,' 5 previously approved by a lower state court, finds strong
administration expense be allowable under state law. See note I supra. Nevertheless, the Smith
inquiry into the necessity of the administration expenses dealt with the necessity requirement
found in the treasury regulation as well as that found in New York law. See notes 22-24 and
accompanying text infra.
I0 mhe Tax CourCs determination that the additional sales of sculpture were not
necessary to preserve the estate or to effect its distribution did not involve a refusal
to follow New York law, but rather was the result of a de novo inquiry into the
factual necessity for these expenditures.
510 F.2d at 483.
11Id. at 482-83 (footnote omitted).
12 Id. at 482 ("Both [New York law] and Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3, like most state laws
concerning executors and administrators, require an administrative expense to be 'necessary'
in order to be allowable.").
13See id. at 482-83. Characterizing the dispute before it as one involving a question of
fact rather than a question of law, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the
grounds that its decision that the sales were not necessary was not "clearly erroneous." Id. at
483.
In addition to the arguments raised in the Tax Court, the executors contended on appeal
that the sales were at least potentially necessary to pay taxes. They argued that since the
Commissioner's original notice of deficiency indicated a tax liability greater than the total
amount of sales, the sales should be considered a necessary attempt to raise sufficient funds
to meet this potential obligation. The Second Circuit dismissed this contention on two
grounds: First, the particular sales objected to by the Commissioner were those which took
place before the notice of deficiency was issued; and second, all sales actually necessary to
pay the final tax liability were approved. Id. at 481-82.
14 Id. at 484-85 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). In arriving at his conclusion, Judge Mulligan
stated that "[tihe laws of the state are interpreted and administered by the courts of the state
and not by the Tax Court of the United States." Id. at 484.
.The Second Circuit did not explicitly state that a de novo inquiry should involve the
application of state law. Rather, the court phrased its decision in terms of an "inquiry into
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support in the Supreme Court decision Conmmissioner v. Estate qf
Bosch. 1 6 In Bosch, the Court was faced with a similar question

regarding the effect of a state trial court decree upon federal estate
tax litigation. The decedent there had created a revocable inter
vivos tfust providing his wife with a life estate in all trust income
and granting her a general power of appointment over the corpus
of the trust. Prior to the decedent's death, his wife executed a
release of this general power of appointment. If found valid, the
release would disqualify the trust from the estate tax marital de-

duction.1 7 A New York trial court declared the release to be a
nullity, and both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit considered
themselves bound by the state decree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "where the federal estate tax liability turns
upon . . . state law, federal authorities are not bound by the
determination made . . . by a state trial court."1' 8

The broad language employed by the Court in Bosch suggests
that its rationale is applicable whenever a federal court is dealing
with a federal tax question requiring an interpretation of state
law. 19 Not surprisingly, therefore, other courts agree with the Smith
the factual necessity for [the] expenditures." Id.at 483. See text accompanying notes 22-24
infra. The use of the regulation by the Tax Court was apparently sustained solely on the basis
that its application achieved the result required by state law. See 510 F.2d at 482. Hence, one
implication of the Smith rationale is that a de novo inquiry into allowability tinder state law is
appropriate.
16 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
17 Qualification of the type of trust involved in Bosch for the marital deduction is
regulated by the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5). The size of the marital deduction is
based in part on the amount and characterization of the property interests received by the
surviving spouse, generally a matter of state law. After the state law determination is made,
the provisions of the Code are applied to determine conclusively the amount deductible. See
10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 61.01, 61.05 (Zimet rev. 1970).
'8 387 U.S. at 457. Prior to its decision in Bosch, the Supreme Court, in Freuler v.
Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934), had indicated that a federal court is bound by a state trial
court decision concerning an underlying issue of state law absent collusion in the state
decree. This led to a sharp conflict among the circuits regarding exactly what was meant by
collusion, with definitions varying from actual fraud to the absence of genuine adverseness
in the state court. Compare Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) (state decree
binding absent fraud) with Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962) (state decree not binding if state proceeding is nonadversary).
For discussions of this controversy, see Braverman & Gerson, The Coclnusiveness of State Court
Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation, 17 TAX L. REV. 545 (1962); Richter, Effect of State Court
Interpretation of lWills, N.Y.U. 24th INST. ON FED. TAX. 257 (1966): Sacks, The Binding Effert of
Nontax Litigation in State Courts, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 277 (1963): Teschner, State
Court Decisions, Federal Taxation, and the Comnmissioner's Wonderland: The Need for Preliminary
Characterizatio, 41 TAXES 98 (1963).
9 "[W]hen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial
court as to an underlying issue of state law should afortiori not be controlling." 387 U.S. at
465. The Bosch Court, analogizing to the situation faced by federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction, applied the doctrine developed in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
and its progeny to federal estate tax litigation and declared that a federal court is bound only
by a decree of the highest court of the state and need only give "proper regard" to decisions
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majority and authorize such de novo inquiries into state law. For
example, in Undertood v. United States, 20 the Sixth Circuit indicated
its approval of a de novo inquiry into the deductibility of an
executor's fee as an administration expense. The state probate
court had authorized an executor's fee substantially higher than
that provided in the decedent's will. The federal district court
disallowed the deduction of the additional fee as an improper
expense under state law. Although it disagreed with the district
court's interpretation of state law and approved the deduction, the
Sixth Circuit clearly indicated that a de novo inquiry was proper.2 1
of lower state courts. 387 U.S. at 465. Courts have since applied this principle to a wide
variety of tax cases. See, e.g., Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 828 (1974) (surrogate's decision characterizing as bequest testamentary transfer in
lieu of payment for services not binding); In re Estate of Abely, 489 F.2d 1327 (1st Cir. 1974)
(probate court's approval of "widow's allowance" not binding); Greene v. United States, 476
F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1973) (state decree that estate taxes should be paid from a particular
portion of estate not binding); Risher v. United States, 465 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1972) (probate
court decision that widow entitled to more than half of estate not binding); Cheng Yih-Chun
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 442 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1971) (surrogate's decision that beneficial use
of estate had vested in particular individual not binding); Kasishke v. United States, 426 F.2d
429 (10th Cir. 1970) (probate court's approval of claim against estate not binding); Cox v.
United States, 421 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970) (state decision establishing widow's share of
estate not binding); Estate of Leggett v. United States, 418 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1969) (state
court decision that life tenant not a debtor with respect to remainderman not binding); In re
Estate of McCoy, 374 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1975)
(state court interpretation of charitable bequests not binding); Lewis v. United States, 485
F.2d 606, 614 n.10 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (state decree that stock margin account had passed to estate
not binding).
This application of the Erie doctrine to federal tax litigation has been criticized by
several commentators who primarily rely upon the differences between diversity and federal
tax cases. In the typical diversity case, no prior decision has been rendered by a state court
on the particular dispute before the federal court. In Bosch-type tax litigation, however, the
precise dispute before the federal court has previously been decided by a state court. For
general discussions of the implications of Bosch, see Browne & Hinkle, Tax Effects of Non-Tax
Litigation: Bosch andBeyond, N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1415 (1969); Scharf, State Lau
in the Tax Court-Controlling Precedents, 26 TAx LAW. 293 (1973); Wissbrun, Bosch and its
Aftermath, The Effect of State Court Decisions on Federal Tax Questions, 114 TRUSTS & ESTATES 8
(1975); Comment, State Court Determinations in Tax Litigation:A New Era, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
197 (1968); Note, Bosch and the Binding Effect of State Court Adjudications upon Subsequent
Federal Tax Litigation, 21 VAND. L. REV. 825 (1968); 21 Sw. L.J. 540 (1967).
Judge Mulligan, dissenting in Smith, sought to distinguish Bosch by pointing out that in
510
Bosch "there was no act of Congress ... ceding jurisdiction to the state [courts] ....
F.2d at 484 n. I (Mulligan, J., dissenting). It is submitted, however, that this distinction only
beclouds the issue. The validity of the release in Bosch was as much a matter of state law as
was the allowability of the commissions in Smith. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) does not
cede jurisdiction to state courts, but rather provides only for the application of state law in
determining the deductibility of an administration expense. Federal courts are often called
upon to apply state law, and this does not involve a ceding of jurisdiction to state courts. See,
e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts required to apply state law in
diversity of citizenship cases absent a controlling federal statute); In re Crosstown Motors,
Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960) (state law applied in a
bankruptcy case). See also Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in JudicialPrecedent (pts. 1-2), 40
TEXAS L. REV. 509, 619 (1962).
20 407 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1969).
21 Id. at 610-11; accord, First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex.
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The controversy generated by Smith results from the fact that
the Tax Court did not actually conduct a de novo inquiry into the
allowability of the sales commissions as administration expenses
under New York law, but rather applied the standards embodied
in the treasury regulation and determined merely that the commissions did not qualify as deductions under those standards.2 2
To consider this a de novo inquiry into the question of allowability under New York law requires a finding that the requirements
of the treasury regulation and the requirements for allowability as
an administration expense under New York law are identical. The
Second Circuit found this requisite unity of identity by equating
the requirement set forth in section 222 of the former New York
Surrogate's Court Act 23 that expenses be "necessarily incurred"
with the necessity standard contained in the treasury regulation. 4
The treasury regulation, however, establishes a strict necessity
standard, limiting deductions to administration expenses necessar1969) (probate court's approval of attorney's fees incurred in will contest not binding). See
also R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 5-7 (3d ed.
1974). In Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967), the allowability of administration expenses was not considered by a state court since state law did not require probate in
this case. Noting that the interest of the federal government is "in protecting its revenues,"
while that of the state is "in protecting its citizens," id. at 659, the Fifth Circuit held that
administration expenses not approved by a state court may nonetheless be deductible for
federal estate tax purposes if a de novo inquiry reveals that such expenses are allowable
under state law. Id. at 652.
A de novo inquiry is not required in every case. In First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 422
F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling approving the
deduction from the gross value of an estate of a claim against the estate settled by the parties
and approved by a state court. The Tenth Circuit indicated therein that Bosch does not
require a de novo inquiry in every circumstance. Id. at 1387. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)
(1958), for example, states that state decrees are ordinarily acceptable if the state court
actually "passes upon the facts upon which deductibility depends." Indeed, there is some
indication in Smith that had there been an adversarial proceeding in the state court a de novo
inquiry might not be proper: "[A]ppellants' claims ... were not contested in the Surrogate's
Court .... In such circumstances, the federal courts cannot be precluded from reexamining
a lower state court's allowance of administration expenses ....
510 F.2d at 482 (citations
omitted).
In Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973), a de novo inquiry was
not required since allowability under state law was admitted by both parties. Some commentators have suggested that Park indicates that a state lower court decision allowing an
administration expense is binding on a federal court. See Chaffin, Estate Planning and
Taxation: CurrentEstate and Gift Tax Developments, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 427,441-42 (1974); 52 N.C.L.
REv. 190, 196-97 (1973).
22 57 T.C. at 660-62.
23 At the time of Smith's death, general administration expenses in New York were
governed by N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 222, ch. 928, § 222, [1920] N.Y. Laws 631 (repealed 1966),
which authorized an administrator to pay the "legal and proper expenses of administration
necessarily incurred by him .... " This statute has since been replaced by N.Y. EST., POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.1(b)(22) (McKinney Supp. 1975), which authorizes a fiduciary "to pay
all other reasonable and proper expenses of administration ....
" Although New York's
present rule does not explicitly require that the expenses be "necessarily incurred," the
legislature has indicated that the present provision incorporates the substance of the old
statute. Revisors' Notes, ch. 952, § 11-1.1(5), [1966] N.Y. Laws 2927.
24 510 F.2d at 482.
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ily incurred in the course of those activities strictly necessary to pay
all debts, expenses, and taxes, and to effect distribution.2 5 New
York law, on the other hand, only requires that the expenses be
necessarily incurred. The New York courts, moreover, have implied that the activities of the executor need only be reasonable and
proper rather than strictly necessary. Thus, by simply identifying
the treasury regulation's necessity requirement with that of New
York, the court failed to give proper recognition to the disparity
between the two sets of criteria. Quite possibly, a particular expenditure will fulfill the requirements of New York law without meeting the more stringent necessity standards established in the treasury regulation.2 7 It should also be noted that this problem may
well arise in other jurisdictions since most states have imposed a
28
necessity requirement similar to that of New York.
Although the Second Circuit apparently approved utilization
of the treasury regulation in a de novo inquiry, 29 the court refused
25 For example, Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 GuM. BULL. 367, 368,
fornerly Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 432, 544, allows for a
deduction of the expenses incurred in selling estate property only "if the sale is necessary in
order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve the
estate, or to effect distribution .... " (emphasis added).
26 New York courts have repeatedly declared that administration expenses must be necessary. However, the courts do not apply a strict necessity standard in determining the
propriety of the expenses incurred, but rather determine whether the executor was acting
reasonably and in good faith within the limits of the authority granted him either by law or
by the will. See In re Estate of Hart, 32 App. Div. 2d 961, 303 N.Y.S.2d 82 (2d Dep't 1969)
(mem.), aff'd meme., 27 N.Y.2d 560, 261 N.E.2d 268, 313 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1970) (expenses of
moving goods of third party from decedent's residence allowed since incurred in good
faith); In re Estate of Morawetz, 35 Misc. 2d 762, 231 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sur. Ct. Albany County
1962) (allowability of various administration expenses discussed in terms of reasonableness);
In re Cohen's Will, 13 Misc. 2d 694, 177 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1958),
modified on other grounds, 9 App. Div. 2d 916, 195 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1959) (expenses
resulting from executor's decision to continue operating decedent's business prior to sale
allowed even though continuation not necessary); In re Estate of Saunders, 77 Misc. 54,
67-69, 137 N.Y.S. 438, 447-48 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1912), aff'd mer., 156 App. Div.
891, 141 N.Y.S. 1145 (2d Dep't 1913), aff'd mein., 211 N.Y. 541, 105 N.E. 1099 (1914)
(brokers fees allowed for sale of land which was authorized by will but not necessary).
27 In Estate of Sternberger v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 207
F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 187 (1955), the Tax Court had
approved the deduction of sales expenses as an administration expense because they were
allowable under New York law even though "[t]he proceeds of the sale were not needed to pay
debts or expenses" within the contemplation of the treasury regulation. 18 T.C. at 842
(emphasis added). Although it is at least arguable that a similar situation existed in Smith, the
Second Circuit refused to recognize the validity of such an approach. Thus, one effect of
Smith2 8is to implicitly overrule Sternberger.
See 31 AM. JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators §§ 524, 527 (1967). For example, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1065 (19.74) provides:
An executor or administrator shall be allowed necessary expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate and, for his services, such fees as the law
provides, with extra expenses.
(emphasis added).
29

Although the Second Circuit did not direct that the regulation be applied in deter-

mining deductibility, it did affirm the Tax Court decision applying the regulation. Moreover,
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to explicitly consider the regulation's validity.3 0 Section 20.2053-3
of the Treasury Regulations has been in effect without substantial
change since 1919,3 1- and yet its validity has only recently been put
directly in issue. The Tax Court in Smith expressly upheld the validity of the regulation, finding it to be a reasonable attempt to
safeguard "the integrity of the estate tax"' 32 by limiting deductible
expenses to those normally anticipated and required.3 3 The Smith
Tax Court was also apparently influenced by the age of the regulation and the fact that Congress has reenacted the estate tax provisions of the Code without indicating any disapproval of the regula34
tion.
In Estate of Park v. Commissioner,35 the Tax Court similarly upheld the regulation's validity in disallowing the deduction of adthe language and the rationale employed by the Second Circuit do seem to indicate an
acceptance of the standards embodied in the regulation. For example, the Smith court
embraced the dichotomy between an expenditure for the benefit of the estate and an
expenditure for the benefit of the beneficiaries, 510 F.2d at 482, a distinction also found in
the treasury regulation. See note 2 supra. The court's discussion of the varying interests of
the federal and state courts in evaluating administration expenses also seems to indicate that
allowability under state law is not in itself sufficient to warrant federal estate tax deductibility
and that the application of federal criteria is required. Indeed, in United States v. Stapf, 375
U.S. 118 (1963), the Supreme Court intimated that the varying state and federal interests in
evaluating administration expenses might give rise to uniquely federal criteria in federal
estate tax litigation. Considering the application of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 812(b)(2),
53 Stat. 123, the predecessor of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a), the Stapf Court stated
that the section "must be read in light of the general policies of taxing the transmission of
wealth at death ... ."Id. at 134. In light of these varying interests, it is arguable that the
term "administration expenses" as used in the Code should be considered a term of art in
federal tax law and that it does not necessarily include every expenditure authorized by a
state. Cl. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940) ("general power of appointment" defined as used in federal tax law); Lyeth v. Hoey. 305 U.S. 188, 191-94 (1938)
("acquired by inheritance" defined as used in federal tax law).
3 510 F.2d at 483.
3
See T.D. 2910, 21 TREAS. DEc. IN'r. REV. 752, 778-79 (1919).
:3257 T.C. at 661-62.
33 Other Tax Court panels have similarly applied the regulation's standards in determining which administration expenses are properly deductible. In Estate of Opal v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 154, 166 (1970), ajf'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971), the Tax
Court disallowed the deduction of accountant's fees as an administration expense because
they did not fulfill the requirements of the treasury regulation. Similarly, in Estate of Swayne
v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 190, 200 (1964), the Tax Court held that expenses incurred in the
sale of estate property were not deductible because they did not meet the regulation's
requirements. In Swayne, however, there was apparently some question as to whether the
expenses were allowable under state law. Although it originally approved of the expenditures, the probate court subsequently affirmed the state estate tax commissioner's refusal to
allow the expenses as a deduction from the state estate tax. In neither of these cases,
however, was the validity of the regulation challenged.
11 57 T.C. at 660. The dissenters of the Snith tax court stated that due to the lack of
evidence that Congress had ever considered the regulation, see H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954); S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954), reenactment of
the estate tax provisions in the 1954 Code does not indicate congressional approval of the
regulation. 57 T.C. at 663-64 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
3 57 T.C. 705 (1972), revsd, 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973).
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ministrative expenses approved by a state probate court.36 The

Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the regulation was an invalid
extension of the provisions of the Code:
By the literal language of § 2053(a), Congress has left the deductibility of administrative expenses to be governed by their
chargeability against the assets of the estate under state law....
In the situation before us, the expenses were admittedly allow[state] law. . . . Hence they are deductible under
able under
37
§2053(a).
In his dissent in Smith, Judge Mulligan adopted a similar rationale,
stating that if the treasury regulation purports to impose a federal
"necessity" requirement for deductibility, it is contrary to the clear
language of the Internal Revenue Code itself, and is, as such,
38
invalid.
Although the Second Circuit avoided complete variance with
the Sixth Circuit by refusing to explicitly uphold the validity of the
treasury regulation, the practical effect of its decision in Smith will
be to engender conflict between the two circuits in determining
deductibility of administration expenses. Under the Second Circuit's ruling in Smith, administration expenses may be subject to a
de novo inquiry employing the stringent necessity standards imposed by the treasury regulation. This stands in sharp contrast to
the policy adopted by the Sixth Circuit of limiting any de novo
36 The Tax Court applied the regulation and concluded that the sales involved were not
necessary to pay debts or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution and were,
therefore, for the benefit of the heirs rather than the estate. 57 T.C. at 709.
37 475 F.2d at 676. Other federal courts have approved administration expenses, if
allowable under state law, without considering the treasury regulation. See, e.g., Union
Commerce Bank v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964) (interest paid on overdue
gift taxes for period after decedent's death held deductible administration expense since
allowable tinder state law); Cadden v. Welch, 298 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1962) (attorneys' fees
deductible administration expense since allowable under state law); Dulles v. Johnson, 273
F.2d 362, 369 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960) (attorneys' fees for individual
legatees deductible administration expense since allowable under state law); Scott v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 444, 445 (8th Cir. 1934) (executors' commission for sale of real estate
deductible administration expense since allowable tinder state law); Schmalstig v. Conner, 46
F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (attorneys' fees deductible administration expense since
allowable under state law); Estate of Todd v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 288, 295 (1971)
(interest on loan to pay death taxes deductible administration expense since allowable under
state law); Estate of Sternberger v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 207
F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953), retdon other grounds, 348 U.S. 187 (1955) (expenses incurred in sale
of real estate deductible administration expense since allowable under state law). See also
Estate of Baldwin v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 654 (1973) (attorneys' fees not deductible
administration expense since not allowable under state law).
38 If the Regulation by adding the word "necessary" gives the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the authority to review the determination of the New York State
Surrogate and interpret what is "necessary" solely from the point of view of the
federal taxing power, then the Regulation conflicts with the Code, is contrary to the
intent of Congress, and is therefore invalid.
510 F.2d at 484 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
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inquiry to the question of allowability under state law. The unfortunate result will necessarily be an uneven, and therefore inequitable, application of the section 2053(a) deduction.3 9
Dennis G. Flynn
39 Until 1970, the Tax Court had declared that as a court of national jurisdiction it was
not bound by and would not follow precedents set by the courts of appeals. See Lawrence v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713 (1957), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1958). It has since reconsidered this issue and presently follows the precedent of whichever
circuit will have jurisdiction of the case on appeal. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). Hence, the Tax Court
will doubtless apply the regulation in cases appealable to the Second Circuit, but not in cases
appealable to the Sixth Circuit.

